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ABSTRACT 
Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are increasing in quantity, capability, and 
availability throughout the world, posing a significant threat to United States naval forces 
operating in littoral waters.  The improving performance and growing availability of 
ASCMs makes a persuasive argument for the U.S. Navy to aggressively expand surface 
combatant defense systems, and perform periodic reviews of existing defensive tactics to 
ensure effective employment of new combat systems.  To guide decision makers in both 
of these areas, simulation and modeling tools are frequently applied.  This thesis assesses 
an event-step Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) model through the evaluation of two 
new hardkill weapon systems, the Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) and an improved 
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).  The performance of both systems is evaluated within 
the context of a single-ship and a multi-ship formation responding to ASCM attacks.  The 
goal of this thesis is threefold, namely to assess the effectiveness of additional anti-ship 
missile defense systems and identify any tactical insights derived from the modeling 
results of the multi-ship formation.  Following these employments of the model, an 




























































The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the available time, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2 
B. PROPOSED DEFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS.........................................4 
1. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) System Characteristics .......4 
2. Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) System Characteristics................5 
C. OBJECTIVE ....................................................................................................6 
II. ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DEFENSE (ASMD) MODEL ..............................................9 
A. ASMD MODEL BACKGROUND .................................................................9 
B. ASMD MODEL APPLICATIONS ................................................................9 
C. ASMD ENTITIES..........................................................................................10 
D. ASMD MODEL DEFENSIVE FIRE LOGIC.............................................11 
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION.....................................................................................13 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT........................................................................13 
B. THE SINGLE-SHIP PROBLEM .................................................................13 
1. Scenario Basics ...................................................................................14 
2. Assumptions Concerning RAM, ESSM, and SM2-ER...................15 
3. Assumptions Concerning Softkill .....................................................15 
4. The Threat ..........................................................................................16 
5. Variables .............................................................................................16 
a. Range.......................................................................................18 
b. ASCM Raid Size ......................................................................18 
c. ASCM Probability of Hit (Phit) ..............................................18 
d. ASCM Launch Cycle Time.....................................................18 
e. Cruiser Missile Defense ..........................................................18 
6. Data Collection...................................................................................19 
C. THE MULTI-SHIP PROBLEM...................................................................19 
1. Scenario Basics ...................................................................................19 
2. Variables .............................................................................................20 
a. Amphibious Ship Formation ..................................................21 
b. Bearing of ASCM Site From Formation ...............................21 
c. Bearing of Cruiser From Guide .............................................21 
d. Range of Cruiser From Guide................................................22 
e. Formation Missile Defense.....................................................22 
f. Formation Softkill Defense ....................................................22 
3. Data Collection...................................................................................22 
IV. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................23 
A. DATA RESULTS FOR SINGLE-SHIP PROBLEM .................................23 
1. Overall Defensive Missile Performance Results..............................23 
2. Testing the Effect of Variables on Model Performance .................25 
a. SAM Hardkill and Range .......................................................25 
b. SAM Hardkill and ASCM Raid Size ......................................27 
c. ASCM Hits and ASCM Raid Size...........................................29 
d. SAM Hardkill and SAM P(Hit) Values..................................30 
ix
e. SAM Hardkill and SAM Launch Cycle Times ......................31 
f. SAM Hardkill and SAM Speeds .............................................32 
3. Pertinent Points Regarding Model Performance with Respect to the 
Single Ship Problem...........................................................................32 
B. DATA RESULTS FOR THE MULTI-SHIP PROBLEM..........................33 
1. Overall Defensive Performance Results by Multi-Ship 
Formation ...........................................................................................33 
2. An Examination of Smaller Subsets of Simulation Data................39 
a. Formation Orientation............................................................39 
b. Cruiser Bearing Relative to the Guide ...................................42 
c. Cruiser Range Relative to the Guide......................................45 
d. Specific Cases Where Successful Defense Can Be Noted .....47 
3. Pertinent Points Regarding Model Performance with Respect to the 
Multi-Ship Problem ...........................................................................49 
V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................51 
A. COMMENTS REGARDING MODEL PERFORMANCE.......................51 
1. The Original Threat: Exocet.............................................................51 
2. ASCM Attrition by Fuel....................................................................52 
3. Data Collection Restrictions on a Modeled Ship with Multiple 
SAMs ...................................................................................................53 
4. Simulation Run Time.........................................................................53 
5. ASMD Documentation.......................................................................53 
B. MAIN CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................54 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.............................54 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................57 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................59 




















LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Engagement zones for RAM, ESSM, and SM2-ER. .......................................14 
Figure 2. Total counts for ASCM hits versus each SAM and firing policy. ...................24 
Figure 3. Total counts of ASCM hardkill by each SAM and firing policy. ....................25 
Figure 4. SAM hardkill results when organized by ASCM raid size and SAM P(hit). ..31 
Figure 5. An illustration of an ASCM attack on two amphibs in: a column, line of 
bearing (135R), and line abreast formations....................................................34 
Figure 6. An illustration of varying dispositions of a multi-ship formation for each 
ASCM attack....................................................................................................35 
Figure 7. Mean ASCM hits against different orientations of amphibious ship 
formations operating without a cruiser. ...........................................................36 
Figure 8. Mean ASCM hits against different orientations of multi-ship formation 
with cruiser bearing 270 Relative, range 2 nm, from the Guide......................37 
Figure 9. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and missile defense. .....................38 
Figure 10. Total ASCM hits vs cruiser bearing from the Guide and missile defense.......38 
Figure 11. Total ASCM hits vs cruiser range from the Guide and missile defense. .........39 
Figure 12. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and an SM2ER-RAM defense. ....40 
Figure 13. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and an ESSM-RAM defense........41 
Figure 14. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and a RAM-RAM defense. ..........42 
Figure 15. Total ASCM hits vs CG bearing relative to Guide and an SM2ER-RAM 
defense. ............................................................................................................43 
Figure 16. Total ASCM hits vs CG bearing relative to Guide and an ESSM-RAM 
defense. ............................................................................................................44 
Figure 17. Total ASCM hits vs CG bearing relative to Guide and a RAM-RAM 
defense. ............................................................................................................44 
Figure 18. Total ASCM hits vs CG range from Guide and an SM2ER-RAM defense. ...45 
Figure 19. Total ASCM hits vs CG range from Guide and an ESSM-RAM defense.......46 
Figure 20. Total ASCM hits vs CG range from Guide and a RAM-RAM defense. .........46 
Figure 21. Total ASCM hits on the cruiser in all scenarios in which both amphibs 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) characteristics. .....................................5 
Table 2. Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) characteristics. .............................................6 
Table 3. Fixed data applied to modeled threat ASCM...................................................16 
Table 4. Simulation matrix of variables for single-ship problem. .................................17 
Table 5. Fixed values for three-ship scenario. ...............................................................20 
Table 6. Simulation matrix of variables for multi-ship problem. ..................................21 
Table 7. Simulation accomplishment for Single-Ship Problem.....................................23 
Table 8. Observed cell counts for SM2ER hardkill and ASCM launch range (nm)......26 
Table 9. Observed cell counts for ESSM hardkill and ASCM launch range (nm). .......26 
Table 10. Observed cell counts for RAM hardkill and ASCM launch range (nm). ........26 
Table 11. Observed cell counts for SM2ER hardkill and ASCM raid size. ....................28 
Table 12. Observed cell counts for ESSM hardkill and ASCM raid size. .......................28 
Table 13. Observed cell counts for RAM hardkill and ASCM raid size. ........................28 
Table 14. Observed cell counts for ASCM hits and ASCM raid size vs an SM2ER 
defense. ............................................................................................................29 
Table 15. Observed cell counts for ASCM hits and ASCM raid size vs an ESSM 
defense. ............................................................................................................29 
Table 16. Observed cell counts for ASCM hits and ASCM raid size vs an RAM 
defense. ............................................................................................................29 
Table 17. Observed cell counts for hardkill by SAMs and SAM P(Hit) values. .............30 
Table 18. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and launch cycle time (sec) 
(SM2ER and RAM). ........................................................................................31 
Table 19. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and launch cycle time (sec) (ESSM 
and RAM). .......................................................................................................31 
Table 20. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and speed (Mach) (SM2ER and 
ESSM)..............................................................................................................32 
Table 21. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and speed (Mach) (RAM and 
ESSM)..............................................................................................................32 
Table 22. Simulation accomplishment for Multi-Ship Problem. .....................................34 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my gratitude and acknowledge the Johns Hopkins 
University Applied Physics Lab (JHUAPL), specifically the departments for Air Defense 
Systems and Joint Warfare Analysis.  Both the staff and faculty demonstrated great 
hospitality, and superb guidance was provided to myself as I attempted to learn the 
nuances of Air Defense theory and the systems involved.  It was during my experience 
tour at JHUAPL that my research generated an idea that eventually evolved into this 
thesis.  I would also like to thank the James Townsend, the developer of the ASMD 
model, for his patience and support as I struggled to learn the inner operations of a very 
ambitious model.  I am grateful to Professor Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Captain, USN(Ret.) 
and Professor Arnold A. Buss for their encouragement and direction while completing 
this work, and for introducing me to exciting aspects of Operations Research of which I 
had little experience.  And finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude and affection to 
my wife Paurenia, who slowed my progress by giving me two enchantingly beautiful 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xvi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Though the capabilities of the modern surface combatant are significant, 
particularly when exercised within the context of a formation of ships, the threat posed by 
modern Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) in littoral waters is greatly accentuated.  This 
is due to the reduction of battle space and warning time that results from proximity of 
land and the relative confinement posed by such proximity or coastal layout, dense 
commercial air and maritime traffic, and the potential use of land-based electronic 
countermeasures (ECM). 
To operate effectively in this environment, the self-defense capability for 
individual surface combatants must be expanded and enhanced.  The ever-increasing 
capabilities of ASCMs cannot be totally deflected by the mere presence of an AEGIS 
warship providing area defense coverage, nor can a Standard Missile (SM) effectively 
compete with all present and future ASCMs. 
To combat the uncertainty that exists regarding the effectiveness of current and 
future defensive missile systems against future threat ASCMs, modeling and simulation 
tools are often applied.  Such models range from the high-resolution naval combat model 
to the aggregated campaign model, and all types have been applied to answer questions 
related to surface combatant air defense.  But there are very few models that account for 
the effects of naval screen formation on defense, or model realistically the manner in 
which missiles choose their targets.  This is the area that the Townsend Anti-Ship Missile 
Defense Model (ASMD) seeks to fill. 
The ASMD model ambitiously attempts to model missile kinematics realistically, 
and handles targeting by accounting for direction of motion, screen design of the naval 
formation, the size of the targets in the formation, and missile altitude.  The goal of this 
thesis is threefold, namely to assess the effectiveness of new anti-ship missile defense 
systems and identify any tactical insights derived from the modeling results of the multi-
ship formation.  Following these employments of the model, an evaluation is made 
regarding the use of the ASMD model as a tool for the tactical commander. 
To determine if the ASMD model is providing reasonable outcomes, two groups 
of simulation are studied.  The first group of simulations is designed to assess the 
effectiveness of future anti-ship missile defense systems against a future ASCM threat.  
xvii
This is accomplished by modeling a single Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) capable ship that 
independently employs each missile system in its defense against varying salvo sizes of 
ASCMs.  Results for this first series of simulations reinforce the superiority of a Shoot-
Shoot-Look firing doctrine, and suggest it is highly possible to model missile systems in 
the ASMD model and obtain the anticipated outcomes. 
The second group of simulations modeled a three-ship naval fomation defending 
against an ASCM attack.  The formation consisted of an AAW-capable ship and two 
larger amphibious ships, and the purpose was to assess the role of screen design on 
shared self-defense.  The outcome revealed a the model was not as sensitive to range as 
expected with respect to the stationing of the AAW ship from the amphibs, but did 
reinforce the notion that stationing the AAW ship on or near the threat axis provided the 
optimal defense opportunities. 
The ASMD model is ambitious in design, and has achieved much of what its 
designer intended.  However, more work is required in several areas of weakness that 
were uncovered during the exercise of the model.  These areas include the tendency of 
the model to freeze in mid-simulation, and the perfect detect-to-engage sequence for the 
surface combatant that tilts the playing field away from the ASCM and provides 
significant advantages to the defensive missile systems employed.  But the ASMD model 
makes significant progress towards providing the decision maker with a model that 
incorporates real tactical considerations that are daily faced by naval operational forces 
projecting power in a littoral environment. 
xviii
I. INTRODUCTION 
When operating in littoral waters, such as the Northern Arabian Gulf, the 
proximity of surface combatants to hostile shores demands that ship self-defense 
requirements be stringent.  The United States Navy (USN) is still in the process of 
transitioning from a blue-water fleet to a fleet with expanded capability for operating in 
littoral waters.  This transition is largely attributed to the decline of the former Soviet 
Union and the subsequent massive proliferation of advanced technologies to Third World 
nations, and is driven largely by the pivotal 1992 publication of From the Sea.  The 
primary threat to surface combatants comes in the form of missile-laden patrol boats and 
mobile truck-launched cruise missiles, as well as some limited capability with regard to 
military aircraft. 
Though the capabilities of the modern surface combatant are significant, 
particularly when exercised within the context of a formation of ships, the threat posed by 
modern Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) in littoral waters is greatly accentuated.  This 
is due to the reduction of battle space and warning time that results from proximity of 
land and the relative confinement posed by such proximity or coastal layout, dense 
commercial air and maritime traffic, and the potential use of land-based electronic 
countermeasures (ECM).  The security of naval operations in the open ocean largely 
results from an advantageous combination of depth of fire, isolation, and superior 
surveillance systems and techniques.  This advantage declines steeply in the littorals, 
particularly for surface combatants operating away from the battle group and performing 
operations such as picket, interdiction, minesweeping, and land attack. 
To operate effectively in this environment, the self-defense capability for 
individual surface combatants must be expanded and enhanced.  The ever-increasing 
capabilities of ASCMs cannot be totally deflected by the mere presence of an AEGIS 
warship providing area defense coverage, nor can a Standard Missile (SM) effectively 
compete with all present and future ASCMs (Ousbourne, 1993).  Early ASCMs were 
subsonic threats designed for low-altitude approaches on target ships.  The cruise missile 
threat challenging the modern navy includes characteristics such as supersonic flight, 
preplanned evasive maneuvers, radar cross-section reduction, and multimode guidance 
(Graff, 1999).  Meanwhile, the littoral warfare environment often results in warships 
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operating independently or in groups of two or three, and proximity to the enemy threat 
significantly reduces reaction time to an ASCM launch.  In view of the challenges posed 
by the modern ASCM and the littoral environment, the Standard Missile is losing its 
advantage for force defense.  A partial solution is to upgrade the self-defense capability 
of all surface combatants.  The Navy is already proceeding in this direction with the 
development of the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS), the Evolved Seasparrow Missile 
(ESSM), and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). 
Where the SSDS provides integration of sensor and weapon systems to grant non-
AEGIS platforms an automated response system, the ESSM and RAM are intended to 
improve point defense and close-in defense respectively.  These latter additions are 
intended to make up for performance deficiencies of Standard Missile and the Close-in 
Weapon System (CIWS) by offering increased kinematics, faster fly-out, supersonic 
flight, and multimode seekers (semi-active homing and infra-red (IR) terminal homing).  
This study places a spotlight on the future employment of ESSM and RAM. 
The addition of these two assets onboard surface combatants requires an 
exploration of the doctrine that exists behind their use, specifically, firing doctrine and 
salvo policy against ASCM threats in the littoral.  The platforms of choice for this study 
include a ship equipped with the Mk 41 Guided Missile Vertical Launch System 
(GMVLS), namely a Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser, and a representation of an 
amphibious ship armed only with the RAM system.  These choices represent a desire to 
model existing platforms that represent high and low levels of self-defense capability.  
The importance of GMVLS is due to its real role as the future launcher system for ESSM, 
while RAM possesses an independent launcher.  Firing doctrine and salvo policy, in 
combination with the orientation of the ship formation relative to the threat axis, will be 
examined against the threat of a supersonic low-flyer. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The ASCM threat arose early in the Cold War, leading to the development of 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that saw initial forays into defensive TALOS, TERRIER, 
and TARTAR SAMs.  Most ominous was the threat from nuclear warhead-tipped 
ASCMs developed by the Soviets early in the Cold War, which influenced everything 
from ship design to unit formations.  Despite the fading of the nuclear threat, its influence 
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on modern warship design is still prevalent despite the obvious vulnerabilities (e.g., a 
lack of armoring) to conventional weapons that afflict staying power of the Surface Fleet 
to this day. (Hughes, 2000) 
The Egyptians were the first to launch an ASCM against a ship, sinking the Israeli 
picket-destroyer Eilat in a 1967 attack.  Other major events in which ASCMs played a 
significant role were the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the 1982 
South Atlantic War, and the Tanker Wars of the 1980’s.  Many other ASCM attacks since 
the Eilat, of varying scope, have also provided the analyst with valuable data in addition 
to the previously mentioned events.  A study authored by John Schulte (1994) utilized 
actual ASCM data from the above-mentioned historical episodes, in which he recorded 
missile attacks and measured their effectiveness from the perspective of the attacker.  
Wayne Hughes (2000) provided a useful summary and interpretation of Schulte’s and 
several other studies affecting warship staying power in the face of an ASCM threat. 
Numerous modeling methods have been used to answer questions regarding 
surface combatant self-defense.  Jerren Gould (1984) examined salvo policies against 
enemy air, demonstrating that with the non-decreasing probability of a single-shot kill, 
the sequence of salvo sizes that minimize the expected number of shots used is also non-
decreasing.  Mark Jarek (1988) utilized a spreadsheet methodology to determine an 
optimal VLS load-out for ship self-defense against ASCMs, examining a force with and 
without Combat Air Patrol (CAP) available.  Jeffrey Cares (1990) sought to describe the 
characteristics of modern salvo warfare after applying several closed-form modeling 
options to a robust data set, and provided suggestions regarding tactical employment of 
forces.  Arthur Drennan (1994) applied a linear programming method to propose a 
coordination policy for NATO Seasparrow Missile (NSSM) and RAM against ASCMs, 
while Hughes (1995) describes his missile salvo equations for warships in combat for the 
purpose of comparing the primary combat characteristics of a warship. 
Of principal importance to this thesis is the work by James Townsend (1999), 
who developed the Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) model.  His object-oriented, 
event-stepping model simulates the entire process by which ASCMs select their targets, 
and by which defenders assign defensive fire.  His purpose was to create a model that can 
be used to examine screen design and defensive firing doctrine for naval formations. 
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B. PROPOSED DEFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS 
Commander Glenn Flanagan, USN, asserts that the threat to surface ships is 
increasing as a result of two factors in modern naval operations.  The first is the 
proliferation of ASCMs; the second is the prolonged periods of operation in littoral 
waters previously discussed in this thesis.  Regarding the former point, Flanagan cites 
seventy nations that currently deploy sea- and land-launched ASCMs, and greater than 20 
that possess air-launched ASCMs.  Many of these countries do not have any ability to 
produce this level of technology, relying on imported missiles with Russian, Chinese, or 
French origins.  The advantage for foreign nations is a powerful and relatively 
inexpensive method to contest a superior naval force. (Flanagan, 1999)  Probably the 
most difficult ASCM for the U. S. Navy to defend against is the Russian-produced 
supersonic Moskit (SS-N-22) missile.  More popularly known as the Sunburn, it can be 
launched from land or naval platforms, and recently has been documented as an exported 
technology to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2000. (Gertz, 2000) 
In the face of this mounting ASCM threat, part of the Navy’s strategy to keep 
pace with the Ship Self-Defense Capstone Warfighting Requirements, encapsulated 
within a 1995 review, is to procure the ESSM and RAM systems. 
1. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) System Characteristics 
The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) is a medium range missile designed to 
offer greater self-protection for surface ships.  Its capabilities are expected to exceed the 
performance of Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), the Navy’s primary surface-to-air fleet 
defense weapon, particularly against low observable extremely maneuverable missiles.  A 
substantial upgrade of the NATO Sea Sparrow (RIM-7P) Missile System (NSSMS), the 
ESSM has greater range and speed and can make flight corrections via radar and 
midcourse uplinks. 
On Aegis ships, ESSM will be launched from Mk 41 VLS Quad Pack canisters 
that will allow an even greater defense missile load-out.  The guidance section is virtually 
the same as its predecessor, but the new rocket motor offers higher thrust, and steering is 
achieved with tail control vice wing control.  Table 1 details the physical features of the 
weapon (Nicholas & Rossi, 1999). 
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Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) 
Dimensions:  Performance:  
Length 12.0 ft Max Range 16 nm 
Diameter 8 in Altitude 16,405 ft 
Span 3.3 ft open / 
2.1 ft folded 
Speed Mach 5.0 
Weight 620.0 lbs   
Guidance: command guidance 
Table 1. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) characteristics. 
2. Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) System Characteristics 
The goal of the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) is to provide surface ships with 
a highly effective, low-cost, point-defense system that offers a significant capability to 
engage and kill incoming ASCMs.  The airframe rolls in flight for stability and is guided 
by dual mode, passive radio frequency/infrared (RF/IR) guidance.  Initial homing is in 
RF, with transition to IR guidance when an ASCM’s IR radiation is acquired.  An 
upcoming RAM Block 1 IR upgrade will permit IR “all-the-way-homing” guidance.  For 
cruisers, destroyers, and possibly frigates, the launcher most likely will not be the 21-cell 
Mk 49 launcher, but rather a proposed upgrade to the existing CIWS mount called Sea 
RAM.  Sea RAM features an 11-cell launcher, and would retain the Phalanx system 










Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) 
Dimensions:  Performance:  
Length 9.2 ft Max Range 5 nm 
Diameter 5 in Altitude n/k 
Span 1.4 ft  Speed Mach 2.0 
Weight 162.0 lbs   
Guidance: dual mode passive RF / IR homing 
Table 2. Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) characteristics. 
C. OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this thesis is threefold, namely to assess the effectiveness of new anti-
ship missile defense systems and identify any tactical insights derived from the modeling 
results of the multi-ship formation.  Following these employments of the model, an 
evaluation is made regarding the use of the ASMD model as a tool for the tactical 
commander.  The broad expectation is that the ASMD model will affirm that the addition 
of ESSM and RAM will offer the tactical commander increased self-defense capability 
and greater flexibility with respect to the orientation of the formation to the threat axis. 
Among the issues not broached by this thesis are procurement analyses, 
evaluation of ship modernization requirements, and optimum missile load-out strategies.  
Each one is very important and being aggressively pursued by the Navy, whereas the 
primary focus of this study concerns tactics, defined by Hughes (2000) as the handling of 
forces in battle. 
The extensive series of simulations performed fall into two phases.  The first 
phase is largely proof of concept in which the ASCM threat is directed against a single 
ship.  The goal was to test the effectiveness of ESSM and RAM additions to the surface 
ship arsenal, as well as observe ASMD model behavior after parameterization of key 
variables.  The second phase of simulations focuses on a multi-ship formation defending 
against the ASCM threat.  The formation consists of two generic amphibious-class 
vessels escorted by an Aegis cruiser.  The purpose is to identify what formation 
orientation relative to the threat axis is most helpful or hurtful to shared self-defense. 
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Several MOEs are proposed to evaluate the model’s various outcomes.  The first 
concerns the percentage of enemy missiles destroyed, and the second tracks the number 
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II. ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DEFENSE (ASMD) MODEL 
A. ASMD MODEL BACKGROUND 
James Townsend notes that there exist a significant number of computer models 
to simulate ship defense against ASCMs, but few provide any insight on the role of 
screen defense.  Some of these models simulate defensive fire by a single ship, including 
among them the Single Ship Air Defense Model (SSDAM) and the Simulation, 
Evaluation, Analysis, and Research on Air Defense Systems (SEAROADS) model.  
Occupying the other end of the spectrum are aggregated campaign models such as the 
Integrated Theater Engagement Model (ITEM) and the Extended Air Defense Simulation 
(EADSIM).  The single-ship models provide reasonably good analyses but cannot be 
extended to multi-ship formations, while the campaign models do not faithfully model 
screen design or firing policy effects.  In the case of ITEM, missile raids are equally 
divided amongst the ships in a targeted formation, followed by the application of Monte-
Carlo methodology to determine if a ship has sustained a missile hit. (Townsend, 1999) 
The issues of portability and ease of use are applicable as well.  Using the 
previously mentioned models above as examples, they would not serve well as tools to 
the tactical commander responsible for the employment of two or more combatants.  The 
single-ship models cannot be made relevant due to the inability to model more than one 
ship.  The campaign model certainly can capture all of the pertinent details, but is 
handicapped by the amount of data and computing capacity required, the complexity 
involved in scenario generation, and requisite operator expertise.  None of these models 
supply the simplicity and relevance sought by the naval officer who desires a quick 
analysis to support an upcoming straits transit, for example.  This is the problem that 
Townsend sought to address. 
B. ASMD MODEL APPLICATIONS 
Townsend (1999) suggested possible applications of his ASMD model for 
hardware acquisition, force structuring, evaluation of the capability of forces, and tactical 
development.  It is the latter application addressed in this thesis for the purpose of gaining 
useful observations on the behavior of the ASMD model. 
The primary goal of Townsend’s (1999) thesis efforts was to develop a model that 
employed a more realistic missile distribution pattern.  This pattern finds its basis in the 
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actual geometry data perceived by each inbound missile.  However, no serious 
application of the ASMD model has been attempted yet.  Townsend demonstrated some 
of the analysis opportunities by running an ASCM attack scenario on a standard carrier 
task group to determine the best screen arrangement and defensive firing policy. 
C. ASMD ENTITIES 
The source of the ASMD model’s construction is the Java programming language, 
with much of the foundation built upon the burgeoning library of Java simulation 
components developed at NPS.  Specific simulation libraries employed are Simkit and 
Modkit.  Simkit’s developer was Kirk Stork (Stork, 1996), and Modkit arrived several 
years later following the efforts of Arent Arntzen (Arntzen, 1998).  In both cases was 
guidance provided by Professor Arnold A. Buss of the Operations Research Department. 
It is a characteristic of Java to support object-oriented programming (OOP), a 
methodology that promotes objects (such as simulated ships and missiles, as in the case 
of this thesis) interacting with each other through the use of methods (or actions).  This 
feature is a great benefit to any future user of the ASMD model who might desire to build 
a new missile object or class of ship. 
Objects in the ASMD model originate from the Composite Unit, a generic object 
with special functional components.  These components include a controller that directs 
the assorted functions, such as movement, sensors, and the ability to interact with other 
objects that results in behavioral change (such as a ship reacting to detection of missiles). 
Drawing the Composite Unit’s properties together into a useful object is the TacticalUnit, 
allowing the disparate components to behave as one entity.  The TacticalUnit object is the 
template from which missiles and ships are created. 
Sensor systems for ships and missiles are fairly simple to construct, where the 
primary feature is maximum theoretical range.  Ships may include multiple active or 
passive sensors. 
In the case of distinct missile systems, these may also number more than one per 
ship.  Defensive gunfire, as in the case of CIWS, along with passive defense methods, are 
aggregated into a numerical probability of an ASM not striking the ship.  This is due to 
the desire to focus primarily on missile-on-missile defense. (Townsend, 1999) 
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D. ASMD MODEL DEFENSIVE FIRE LOGIC 
The ASMD model is currently configured to adjudicate defensive battles, and 
each side is assigned a FireDistributor that performs missile fire decisions.  Sensor 
detection of a new target results in the identity of that target being passed to the 
FireDistributor, which searches through the available ships to determine the one with the 
best opportunity for target intercept. 
Several mediator functions referee the behavior between individual missiles and 
their targets.  Mediators determine whether a target goes detected or undetected, track the 
movement of a target while guiding the missile to intercept it, plan the detonation, and 
assess the outcome, all with Monte Carlo generated probabilities. 
The first of three possible outcomes that occur following missile detonation is a 
miss due to the physical range between missile and target being too great.  The second is 
that the target sustains a missile hit, while the third outcome is missile destruction due to 











































III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
There are few, if any, ship defense models that feature the tactical role of screen 
design as a tool against ASCMs.  The ASMD model makes up for this deficiency by 
generating rational missile distribution patterns that are dependent on the screen 
formation.  The model will be applied to evaluate the effectiveness of future ship defense 
systems, notably ESSM and RAM, against a homogeneous ASCM attack.  Insight will be 
sought regarding how well the new systems complement screen formation design, and 
firing policy will be validated as well.  Several measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are 
proposed to evaluate the model’s various outcomes.  The first concerns the percentage of 
enemy missiles destroyed, and the second tracks the number of ASCM hits against a 
target ship. 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
The physical characteristics of ESSM and RAM have been previously discussed, 
and the future employment of each are geared toward improving a surface ship’s layered 
defense and flexibility in response. 
In general, the extensive series of simulations performed fall into two phases.  
The first phase is largely proof of concept in which the ASCM threat is directed against a 
single ship.  The goal is to test the effectiveness of ESSM and RAM when added to the 
surface ship arsenal, as well as to identify ASMD model behavior following 
parameterization of key variables.  The second phase of simulations focuses on a multi-
ship formation defending against the ASCM threat.  The purpose is to identify what 
formation orientation relative to the threat axis is most helpful or hurtful to shared self-
defense. 
B. THE SINGLE-SHIP PROBLEM 
The purpose of the single-ship problem is largely proof-of-concept, specifically, 
to test each missile system independently of any other for improvement in its respective 
layer of ship defense.  The platform selected for study is an Aegis cruiser outfitted with 
Mk 41 GMVLS, and the means of defense to be evaluated independently and sequentially 
are SM2ER, ESSM, and RAM.  Passive defense measures are also factored in, while 
CIWS is not included, for reasons to be explained below. 
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Figure 1 depicts the concept of engagement zones for RAM, ESSM, and SM2ER.  
The diagram illustrates that each missile has a limited range, the shortest belonging to 
RAM at approximately 5 nautical miles (nm), ESSM slightly greater at 16 nm, and 
SM2ER with the greatest estimated range at 100 nm. 
 
 
Figure 1. Engagement zones for RAM, ESSM, and SM2-ER. 
1. Scenario Basics 
To meet the goals of the preliminary phase of simulation, a simple scenario was 
devised to consist of an ASCM salvo fired down a single line of bearing (LOB) at an 
Aegis cruiser.  The cruiser is set on a course and speed of 000T at approximately 13 
knots, and the ASCM salvo is fired from a relative bearing of 270.  The assumptions 
regarding the cruiser’s state of readiness are that the ship is alert with 100 percent system 
availability.  One ASCM hit will put the cruiser out of action (OOA) and unable to 
employ hardkill methods, but softkill is still available. 
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The system not included in this study is CIWS.  One reason has to do with the 
realistic limitations of CIWS, specifically that it is good for one engagement alone.  The 
second reason involves its expected replacement by the more effective RAM system.  
CIWS is probably fairly effective against an older generation of ASCM, but arguably less 
so against the terminal maneuvers of the newer breed of supersonic low-flyers.  A third 
reason is the desire to keep the scenarios simple by focusing on hardkill by missile 
systems. 
2. Assumptions Concerning RAM, ESSM, and SM2-ER 
The ASMD model maintains a simple approach towards ASCM detection and 
tracking: that all threat missiles in a salvo are detected and successfully tracked once in 
sensor range.  
The delay between SM2-ER and ESSM launches is set for one second due to the 
effectiveness of the Mk 41 VLS.  In the case of RAM, there is a fratricide issue due to the 
IR terminal homing characteristic of the missile.  With this in mind, a launch cycle delay 
of four seconds was set.  In all three cases, the launch delay is intended to be a 
representative value rather than a true indication of system performance. 
The Probability of Kill (PK) is a specified constant for each missile throughout its 
respective engagement envelope.  This means that range-dependent PKs are not applied 
in the ASMD model.  The respective PKs for SM2-ER, ESSM, and RAM are 0.5, 0.6, 
and 0.7.  Each missile is expected to be a highly effective weapon system against future 
ASCM threats, so a conscious decision was made by the author to reasonably undervalue 
the PK of each missile against the particular ASCM threat described below.  
Furthermore, the PKs represent the relative effectiveness expected from each layer of 
defense, such that RAM is a relatively better ASCM killer than SM2-ER. 
3. Assumptions Concerning Softkill 
Hughes discusses the effectiveness of softkill measures in Fleet Tactics, and 
through the analysis of historical data, is able to suggest that a combat-ready ship 
employing passive defense can enjoy a greater than 0.6 probability of not sustaining a hit 
by an ASCM (Hughes, 2000).  With this in mind, a softkill probability of 0.5 is assigned 
to the cruiser.  The true effectiveness of softkill measures against the modern ASCM, 
supersonic or otherwise, is assuredly classified.  Knowing the historical numbers, and 
15
assuming technology improvements in both softkill and ASCMs, it is entirely reasonable 
to assign a value of 0.5. 
After all the scenarios are run and the data is analyzed, it may appear that a 
disproportionate advantage has been afforded to either side of the missile exchange.  If 
this is the case, then the adjustment of this value is a good place to begin for the purpose 
of tilting the playing field in any manner the user may find necessary.  Provided to 
ASCM has survived the defensive missile fire of the ship, a smaller value will afford the 
ASCM greater opportunities to achieve a hit. 
4. The Threat 
The most likely ASCM threat to be encountered by today’s naval force is a 
subsonic missile, particularly the French-made Exocet.  However, for the purpose of this 
study, an evaluation of anticipated ship defense systems against a more challenging 
ASCM is warranted, namely a supersonic low-flyer.  Table 3 details some of the fixed 
data applied to the threat ASCM modeled for the scenario. 
Notional Supersonic Low-Flyer ASCM 
Performance:  
Max Range 50 nm 
Cruise Altitude 20 m 
Terminal Altitude 7 m 
Speed Mach 2.5 
Guidance: active radar seeker in terminal phase
Table 3. Fixed data applied to modeled threat ASCM. 
5. Variables 
For each variation of the standard scenario, the defensive battle is run five times 
in order to reduce variation somewhat.  It would be preferable to run each variation of the 
battle more than five times; however the large number of simulations, and the time 
requirements for each run, forces the constraint.  The standard scenario features five 
primary independent variables that were altered for the purpose of testing the ASMD 
model’s sensitivity.  These include the range of the ASCM launcher to the cruiser, ASCM 
raid size, ASCM Probability of Hit (Phit), ASCM launch cycle time, and the cruiser 
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missile defense available.  Table 4 displays the matrix of variables altered for each 
simulation run.  Based on the information presented in the table, the number of distinct 
simulations that were run in support of this portion of the study is 486. 
1 15 
2 25 1 Range (nm) 
3 35 
1 2 
2 4 2 Raid Size 
3 8 
1 0.7 
2 0.75 3 ASCM Phit 
3 0.8 
1 1 sec 
2 4 sec 4 ASCM Launch Rate
3 8 sec 
1 SM2-ER (SSL/SLS) 
2 ESSM (SSL/SLS/SingleShot) 5 Cruiser Defense 
3 RAM (SingleShot) 
Table 4. Simulation matrix of variables for single-ship problem. 
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a. Range 
The range between the ASCM launcher and the cruiser was varied among 
three values: 15, 25, and 35 nautical miles.  The purpose of varying range is to test the 
ASMD model and determine if it meets expectations.  Specifically, the closer the ship is 
to a coastal or sea-based ASCM launcher, the shorter the reaction time and less likely the 
ship can defend against an attack.  The cruiser should sustain more hits as the range 
decreases. 
b. ASCM Raid Size 
The ASCM raid size is varied from a choice of three values: 2, 4, and 8 
ASCMs.  A conscious decision was made to model raid sizes with values that would not 
be much greater than real world expectations.  The larger ASCM salvoes should result in 
more hits on the cruiser, particularly when launched at close range. 
c. ASCM Probability of Hit (Phit) 
There are three values that can be assigned to the ASCM: 0.6, 0.75, and 
0.8.  When an ASCM survives the defensive battle, it will score a hit on the cruiser with 
the assigned probability. 
d. ASCM Launch Cycle Time 
The rate of fire by the ASCM battery is varied to assume values of one, 
four, and eight seconds.  The shorter the interarrival time of the threat stream, the greater 
should be the difficulty for the cruiser to successfully engage all ASCMs in the salvo. 
e. Cruiser Missile Defense 
Each simulation run features only one of the three surface-to-air missiles 
available to the cruiser, namely SM2-ER, ESSM, or RAM, supplemented by a softkill 
capability.  Within this variable, firing policy is tested as well.  SM2-ER is simulated 
with both Shoot-Shoot-Look (SSL) and Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS).  ESSM is simulated 
with SSL, SLS, and SingleShot (S).  RAM is simulated with SSL and S.  ESSM and 
RAM are forecast to be very potent systems against low flyers, so SingleShot is tested in 
both cases to determine if effectiveness is sufficient.  It was further decided to not run 
simulations with RAM applying SLS, due to the significant time delay between launches 
(following fratricide concerns) and the short intercept ranges of this system. 
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6. Data Collection 
The executable program of the ASMD model is coded so that each of the 486 
distinct simulations run is repeated five times.  This allows for data to be generated, from 
which measures of effectiveness can be determined.  Possible MOEs are: 
a. Number of ASCM hits on a ship. 
b. Number of ASCMs that achieve homing on a ship.  
c. Number of shots taken at ASCM. 
d. Number of ASCMs attrited by missile shots. 
e. Number of ASCMs attrited by softkill. 
For each of these potential MOEs, the data available for analysis are the mean, 
standard deviation, maximum value, and minimum value. 
For this phase of the study, the utilized MOEs are the number of ASCMs attrited 
by missile shots, and the number of ASCM hits on a ship.  Broadly, it is anticipated that 
the data will demonstrate an improvement in self-defense for the cruiser through 
employment of ESSM and/or RAM over SM2-ER alone. 
C. THE MULTI-SHIP PROBLEM 
As Hughes (2000) states in his discussion of fleet tactics, “position relative to the 
enemy is still a vital tactical ingredient” and shall serve as the basis for this second phase 
of study.  The addition of new technologies, specifically RAM and ESSM, to a ship’s 
arsenal has great potential for influencing the tactical positioning of one or more ships.  
The proposed scenario consists of a notional amphibious readiness group (ARG) 
containing two generic amphibious-class ships and an Aegis cruiser operating in mutual 
defense.  The Aegis cruiser is arguably the most capable combatant for waging an 
offensive or defensive battle, while the amphibs possess only a self-defense capability 
consisting of RAM and softkill measures. 
1. Scenario Basics 
The scenario applied in the single-ship problem was modified for the three-ship 
instance, in which one of the amphibs is assigned the role of formation guide.  As before, 
the ASCM salvo is fired down a single line of bearing (LOB) at the ship formation.  The 
formation is set on a course and speed of 000T at approximately 13 knots, and the ASCM 
salvo fired from various relative bearings.  The assumptions regarding the state of 
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readiness for all ships are that they are alert with 100 percent system availability.  One 
ASCM hit will put any ship out of action (OOA) and unable to continue the defensive 
battle with hardkill systems. 
All of the assumptions regarding SM2-ER, ESSM, and RAM remain intact from 
the single-ship scenario. The only variation regarding missile systems is for the amphibs.  
Only the cruiser will be modeled with SM2-ER, ESSM and RAM, while the amphibs will 
be modeled with RAM alone.  The latter decision followed an examination of the hardkill 
systems currently employed on different classes of amphibs in the USN inventory, 
revealing many different combinations of missile systems (including none in some cases).    
Table 5 offers a snapshot of the key values that are fixed for the two-ship scenario. 
Formation Amphib1 (Guide), Amphib2, CG 
Formation range 
from ASCM site 
35 
ASCM Raid Size 10 
ASCM Phit 0.8 
SM2-ER Phit 0.5 
ESSM Phit 0.6 
RAM Phit 0.7 
Softkill effectiveness 0.4 
Table 5. Fixed values for three-ship scenario. 
The ASCM threat continues to be modeled as a supersonic low-flyer with a high 
Phit of 0.8, but with a fixed salvo size of ten missiles. 
2. Variables 
For each variation of the standard three-ship scenario, the defensive battle is run 
five times.  The scenario features five primary independent variables that are altered for 
the purpose of identifying the ship formation orientations that provide the greatest mutual 
defense benefits.  These include the formation of the amphibious ships, the relative 
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bearings of the cruiser and the ASCM site from the formation, the range of the cruiser 
from the Guide, and the formation missile defense applied in a particular simulation run.  
Table 6 displays the matrix of variables adjusted for each simulation run.  A total of 135 
distinct simulations are run for this phase of the study. 
Amphibious Ship Formation Column, Line of Bearing, Line Abreast
Relative Bearing of CG from Guide 180, 225, 270, 315, 360 
Range of CG from Guide (nm) 2, 5, 10 
Defense employed by CG / Amphibs 
- SM2-ER / RAM 
- ESSM / RAM 
- RAM / RAM 
Rel. Bearing of ASCM site from Formation 180, 225, 270, 315, 360 
Table 6. Simulation matrix of variables for multi-ship problem. 
a. Amphibious Ship Formation 
The formation of the two amphibious ships for any simulation run consists 
of either a column, a line of bearing, or a line abreast.  The range between the two ships is 
fixed at one nautical mile, and a relative bearing of 135 degrees from the Guide to the 
second amphib was chosen for the line of bearing. 
b. Bearing of ASCM Site From Formation 
Within the executable program, the bearing is coded to iterate every 45 
degrees from 180R to 360R.  For each instance of the ship formation that is simulated, 
the ASCM site is shifted to a different bearing five times.  This has the benefit of more 
thoroughly testing a particular formation orientation by launching on the formation from 
different angles, with the expectation that weak spots in the defense will be revealed. 
c. Bearing of Cruiser From Guide 
The bearing of the cruiser from the Guide is varied every 45 degrees from 
180R to 360R for a total of five different formation orientations by bearing. 
21
d. Range of Cruiser From Guide 
The range of the cruiser from the Guide is assigned values of 2, 5, and 10 
nautical miles.  In combination with the changes in bearing, a total of 15 different 
positions of the cruiser relative to any particular formation are tested. 
e. Formation Missile Defense 
There are three possible missile defenses modeled on each change to the 
formation orientation.  The first defense that is tested models SM2-ER on the cruiser, and 
RAM on both amphibs.  The second defense models ESSM on the cruiser and RAM on 
the amphibs.  The third defense tests the effectiveness of RAM alone on all ships.  The 
salvo policy in all cases consists of Shoot-Shoot-Look (SSL). 
f. Formation Softkill Defense 
A softkill effectiveness of 0.4 is applied this time, primarily due to the 
presence of the two amphibs which offer a far larger radar cross section than the cruiser.  
One of the weaknesses of the model is that only one value for softkill can be set, and it 
applies to all ships in the formation.  A better method would allow a different value to be 
assigned to each ship, and when combined with the different RCS values, a greater 
degree of complexity in the softkill defense battle should be achieved that may mirror 
reality more closely. 
3. Data Collection 
Data collection and MOEs for the two-ship scenario simulations mirror the 









A. DATA RESULTS FOR SINGLE-SHIP PROBLEM 
1. Overall Defensive Missile Performance Results 
Table 7 details the breakdown for the simulations accomplished in the Single-
Ship Problem, specifically, an ASCM site firing on a modeled AEGIS cruiser.  Three 
missile systems were modeled and tested, and the respective firing policies that were 
utilized are also listed.  The same eighty-one scenarios are run for each missile system, 
and for each firing policy.  The model’s system limitations, as well as the time demands 








SSL 81 5 405SM2 SLS 81 5 405
SSL 81 5 405
SLS 81 5 405ESSM 
S 81 5 405
SSL 81 5 405RAM S 81 5 405
    567   2835
Table 7. Simulation accomplishment for Single-Ship Problem. 
Figure 2 offers an overall snapshot of the performance of each missile system and 
its respective firing policy.  Each trial returns a count of ASCM hits on the cruiser for that 
single missile exchange, and statistical data is generated following the fifth trial.  The 
graph in Figure 2 displays the total hits by the ASCM across all five trials for each of the 
eighty-one scenarios, and offers some interesting observations. 
Each missile system defends best when in a SSL firing mode, and progressively 
worsens when SLS and/or S firing policies are employed.  This is observed in Figure 2 by 
the increasing number of ASCM hits on the cruiser when SSL, SLS, and S are 
respectively applied to each missile system.  By inspection, firing policy has a significant 
effect on the number of ASCM hits received by the cruiser.  As in the case of SM2ER, 
the difference between SSL and SLS is 194 ASCM hits, suggesting a decisive advantage 
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for a SSL policy.  This agrees with the firing policy conclusions reached in some of the 
studies cited in the first chapter of this thesis. 
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Figure 2. Total counts for ASCM hits versus each SAM and firing policy. 
Furthermore, accepting SSL as the optimum firing policy, ESSM demonstrates 
the greatest effectiveness against the supersonic, low-flying ASCM modeled in this 
thesis.  Over the same eighty-one scenarios or 405 trials, ESSM permits a paltry 12 
ASCM hits, while RAM has the worst performance with 345 hits on the cruiser.  SM2 
falls near the middle with 158 hits inflicted.  The performance of RAM is sensible, such 
as it is, because the missile system is designed for close-in defense out to a maximum of 
5 nautical miles (nm).  RAM cannot be expected to handle saturation (ie, many and/or 
closely spaced missiles) well, particularly when faced with a launch delay for fratricide 
reasons (in this case, four seconds). 
Figure 3 displays the success of the defensive missile systems in killing ASCMs, 
and the data is managed in the same manner as represented in Figure 2.  The observations 
parallel those made for Figure 2, that for each missile system a policy of SSL is superior, 
and ESSM is the best performer while RAM is the worst. 
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Figure 3. Total counts of ASCM hardkill by each SAM and firing policy. 
2. Testing the Effect of Variables on Model Performance 
An effort was made to understand the sensitivity of the model following 
manipulation of some primary variables.  Of particular interest are tests of independence 
regarding the effectiveness of defensive missile systems when examined against different 
categories of variables. 
The data was originally presented in the form of counts or frequencies, and the 
total counts across each set of 405 trials was organized into contingency tables for 
categorical data analysis.  Tests for independence are conducted with the application of 
the Chi-square (χ2) test. 
a. SAM Hardkill and Range 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 contain the observed cell counts for ASCM launch 
platform range and hardkill by SM2ER, ESSM, and RAM.  The hypothesis of interest in 
each case is that hardkill results for the SAM are independent of range.  At a significance 





 15 25 35  
SM2 393 472 515 1380
Softkill 86 75 49 210
Total Kills 479 547 564 1590
Table 8. Observed cell counts for SM2ER hardkill and ASCM launch range (nm). 
 15 25 35  
ESSM 624 620 621 1865
Softkill 2 4 3 9
Total Kills 626 624 624 1874
Table 9. Observed cell counts for ESSM hardkill and ASCM launch range (nm). 
 15 25 35  
RAM 266 285 256 807
Softkill 181 176 173 530
Total Kills 447 461 429 1337
Table 10. Observed cell counts for RAM hardkill and ASCM launch range (nm). 
In the latter two cases, the hypothesis holds true.  For ESSM, the 
calculated value of the test statistic is 0.676 with a p-value of 0.713.  RAM data yielded a 
calculated value of 0.632 with a p-value of 0.729. 
SM2ER and range, however, does reject the null hypothesis with a 
calculated test statistic value of 19.585 and a p-value less than 0.001.  The explanation for 
this divergence probably has to do with the maximum ranges set for each SAM as they 
relate to the ASCM launch range.  With possible ASCM launch ranges of 15, 25, and 35 
nm, only SM2ER with a max range of 100 nm has the potential to engage at all distances.  
The further the ASCM launch, the more engagement opportunities SM2ER will have.  In 
the case of ESSM and RAM, their max ranges are respectively 16 nm and 5 nm, so both 
missile systems are forced to wait until the ASCM enters their respective engagement 
zones. 
Another factor possibly confounding any advantages that may arise out of 
the range from the formation of an ASCM launch site is the manner in which detection is 
handled by the ASMD model.  As the code is currently written, detection and tracking by 
sensors are perfect.  However, real world ASCM threats, present and future, are typically 
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characterized by some degree of stealth.  Stealth can be conferred by a low flight profile, 
high speeds and maneuver that challenge the tracking radar, environmental conditions, or 
by passive and active countermeasures.  All of these characteristics impact the Signal 
Target Threshold (STS), the point at which a ship’s radar return is strong enough for 
track and engagement of the ASCM to proceed.  Typically, STS occurs at or near the 
radar horizon, perhaps closer to the ship, depending on the threat.  As an example, a 
ship’s radar may detect a target from as far away as fifty nautical miles, but may not 
receive sufficient radar return for tracking and illumination until twenty nautical miles.  
This is why ships generally consummate engagements within the radar horizon.  It goes 
without saying that STS can have a deleterious effect on the Detect-to-Engage (DTE) 
sequence. 
Townsend’s ASMD model establishes several limits on the functionality 
of sensors.  There is a maximum range for target detection, a maximum detection rate, 
and a maximum number of targets that can be tracked at any one time. (Townsend, 1999)  
At the moment, there is no method for collecting sensor data to determine when detection 
occurs.  With that in mind, if the user models his sensors with the above parameters 
following real world values, his detection and track characteristics can be predicted to 
greatly exceed expectations. 
In addition to the effects of simple sensors, Townsend chose not to include 
features concerning target aspect and radar cross section of the threat since the additional 
complexity wasn’t relevant to the problem he was investigating (Townsend email of 
October 1, 2000).  It becomes arguable, though, that to gain insight into defense against 
small-scale missile attacks, a ship’s sensors necessarily require a significant stressor to 
inject realism into the simulation. 
b. SAM Hardkill and ASCM Raid Size 
Tables 11, 12, and 13 contain the observed cell counts for ASCM raid size 
and hardkill by SM2ER, ESSM, and RAM.  The hypothesis of interest in each case is that 
hardkill results for the SAM are independent of ASCM raid size.  At a significance level 
of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 value for 2 df is 5.991. 
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  2 4 8  
SM2 214 427 739 1380
Softkill 21 40 149 210
Total Kills 235 467 888 1590
Table 11. Observed cell counts for SM2ER hardkill and ASCM raid size. 
 2 4 8  
ESSM 269 534 1062 1865
Softkill 0 2 7 9
Total Kills 269 536 1069 1874
Table 12. Observed cell counts for ESSM hardkill and ASCM raid size. 
 2 4 8  
RAM 115 204 488 807
Softkill 96 148 286 530
Total Kills 211 352 774 1337
Table 13. Observed cell counts for RAM hardkill and ASCM raid size. 
In the case of SM2ER and RAM, the null hypothesis is rejected, 
suggesting that ASCM raid size did affect the hardkill results.  For ESSM, the calculated 
value of the test statistic is 2.108 with a p-value of 0.348, supporting the null hypothesis. 
SM2ER data reports a calculated test statistic value of 22.402 and a p-
value less than 0.001.  RAM data yielded a calculated value of 6.216 with a p-value of 
0.045.  As shown in Figure 3, ESSM performs exceptionally well against the modeled 
ASCM, while SM2ER and RAM enjoy far less success in comparison.  Each modeled 
SAM is fairly distinct from the others in terms of P(Hit) values, max range, speed, launch 
cycle times, and launcher capacity (40 SM2ER and ESSM in the VLS, 11 RAM) .  The 
manner in which these variables have come together and provided such an effective result 
for ESSM has significantly weakened any advantage normally attributed to a large 
ASCM raid size.  This model behavior in the case of ESSM will be explained later.  
SM2ER and RAM are not so effective that large raid sizes can be engaged as effectively 
as small raid sizes.  This is a reasonable expectation from a real-world point of view, that 
larger raid sizes increase the likelihood a leaker will penetrate and hit the ship. 
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c. ASCM Hits and ASCM Raid Size 
Examining the effects of raid size on ASCM hits yields some interesting 
insights.  Tables 14, 15, and 16 contain the observed cell counts for ASCM hits and 
ASCM raid size against each missile defense system.  The hypothesis of interest in each 
case is that ASCM hits are occurring independent of ASCM raid size.  At a significance 
level of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 value for 2 df is 5.991. 
 2 4 8  
SM2 17 37 104 158
Softkill 21 40 149 210
Total Kills 38 77 253 368
Table 14. Observed cell counts for ASCM hits and ASCM raid size vs an SM2ER 
defense. 
 2 4 8  
ESSM 1 4 34 39
Softkill 0 2 7 9
Total Kills 1 6 41 48
Table 15. Observed cell counts for ASCM hits and ASCM raid size vs an ESSM 
defense. 
 2 4 8  
RAM 34 119 192 345
Softkill 96 148 286 530
Total Kills 130 267 478 875
Table 16. Observed cell counts for ASCM hits and ASCM raid size vs an RAM 
defense. 
The null hypothesis is not rejected for the data provided in Tables 14 and 
15, suggesting that ASCM hits occur independently of ASCM raid size when SM2ER or 
ESSM are defending the ship.  ASCM hits data versus SM2ER reports a calculated test 
statistic value of 1.218 and a p-value equal to 0.544.  ESSM data yielded a calculated 
value of 1.144 with a p-value of 0.564.  The null hypothesis is rejected in the case of 
ASCM hits versus RAM defense, with a test statistic equal to 12.656 and a p-value of 
0.002.  This result likely reflects the 5 nm engagement zone and fratricide delay for 
RAM, which can easily lead to saturation of the defense by large ASCM raid sizes.  
Again, RAM is expected to handle limited ASCM raid sizes or a small number of leakers. 
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d. SAM Hardkill and SAM P(Hit) Values 
Table 17 contains the observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and P(Hit) 
values that respectively apply to SM2ER, ESSM, and RAM.  The hypothesis of interest 
in each case is that hardkill results for the SAM are independent of assigned P(Hit) for 
the defensive missile systems.  At a significance level of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 value for 2 
df is 5.991. 
 0.5 0.6 0.7  
Hardkill 1380 1865 807 4052
Softkill 210 9 530 749
Total Kills 1590 1874 1337 4801
Table 17. Observed cell counts for hardkill by SAMs and SAM P(Hit) values. 
The analysis result definitively rejects the null hypothesis which states that 
P(Hit) values do not influence hardkill results for a SAM.  A test statistic of 919.155 
provides a p-value equal to zero. 
Probability-of-hit values exert a significant measure of control over the 
performance of modeled defensive missile systems, but certainly are not the sole 
determinant.  The manner in which the model handles an engagement mirrors fairly 
closely a real-world engagement.  The ship’s sensors detect and track the threat missile, 
then a surface-to-air missile is launched and guided all the way to intercept.  Proper 
kinematics are applied to missile flight within the model.  Whether a kill occurs at 
intercept or not is finally determined by the P(Hit) value. 
Figure 4 illustrates well the non-primary role of P(Hit) values in the final 
hardkill counts.  Though RAM is expected to be the most lethal missile with a P(Hit) 
equal to 0.7, its ASCM hardkill counts pale in comparison to SM2ER and ESSM.  This 
demonstrates a certain level of complexity within the model when it comes to resolving a 
missile exchange.  RAM’s lethality is handicapped to a greater extent than SM2ER and 
ESSM by range restrictions, perhaps speed, and launch delay due to fratricide.  SM2ER 
makes up for its P(Hit) weakness with a greater engagement range and faster subsequent 
launches out of the MK41 VLS. 
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Figure 4. SAM hardkill results when organized by ASCM raid size and SAM P(hit). 
e. SAM Hardkill and SAM Launch Cycle Times 
Tables 18 and 19 contain the observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and 
launch cycle times (sec) that respectively apply to SM2ER and RAM, and ESSM and 
RAM.  The hypothesis of interest in both cases is that hardkill results for SAMs are 
independent of how quickly the subsequent missiles leave the launcher.  At a significance 
level of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 value for 2 df is 5.991. 
 1  (SM2ER) 4  (RAM)  
Hardkill 1380 807 2187
Softkill 210 530 740
Total Kills 1590 1337 2927
Table 18. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and launch cycle time (sec) 
(SM2ER and RAM). 
 1  (ESSM) 4  (RAM)  
Hardkill 1865 807 2672
Softkill 9 530 539
Total Kills 1874 1337 3211
Table 19. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and launch cycle time (sec) (ESSM 
and RAM). 
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In both cases the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the statement that 
launch cycle times do indeed affect hardkill results.  The comparison between SM2ER 
and RAM yielded a test statistic equal to 268.645 and a p-value of zero.  The comparison 
between ESSM and RAM validates the former with a test statistic of 856.678 and p-value 
equal to zero. 
f. SAM Hardkill and SAM Speeds 
Tables 20 and 21 contain the observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and 
speed (Mach) that respectively apply to SM2ER and ESSM, and RAM and ESSM.  The 
hypothesis of interest in both cases is that hardkill results for SAMs are independent of 
the speed of the defensive missile itself.  At a significance level of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 
value for 2 df is 5.991. 
 2.5 (SM2ER) 5.0 (ESSM)  
Hardkill 1380 1865 3245
Softkill 210 9 219
Total Kills 1590 1874 3464
Table 20. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and speed (Mach) (SM2ER and 
ESSM). 
 2.5 (RAM) 5.0 (ESSM)  
Hardkill 807 1865 2672
Softkill 530 9 539
Total Kills 1337 1874 3211
Table 21. Observed cell counts for SAM hardkill and speed (Mach) (RAM and 
ESSM). 
Analysis of the data in both cases leads to rejection of the null hypothesis, 
suggesting that missile speed does affect hardkill results.  The comparison between 
SM2ER and ESSM yielded a test statistic equal to 235.265 and a p-value of zero.  The 
comparison between RAM and ESSM validates the former with a test statistic of 856.678 
and p-value equal to zero. 
3. Pertinent Points Regarding Model Performance with Respect to the Single 
Ship Problem 
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In looking at the Single Ship problem, the objective was to gain understanding of 
the ASMD model’s behavior by seeking to answer questions regarding the employment 
of planned defensive missile systems.  The future missile systems of interest are ESSM 
and a new variant of RAM, both of which appear to have performed as expected relative 
to SM2ER in terms of hardkill effectiveness.  To that end, the model has demonstrated a 
future potential for conducting quick assessments on new or proposed missile systems. 
Variables to which the model demonstrated sensitivity includes missile speed, 
missile P(hit) values, and the time delay between missile launches on the defensive side.  
Some sensitivity was also shown in the case of ASCM raid sizes, which is a good result 
because saturation can occur to even the best defense. 
Sensor detection by the ship is conveyed a sizable advantage due to the manner it 
was modeled as discussed earlier.  Though it can be overcome, this does have the effect 
of tilting the playing field in favor of the ship, and will require the user to model his 
systems and characteristics carefully to ensure a satisfactory result from the missile 
exchange. 
B. DATA RESULTS FOR THE MULTI-SHIP PROBLEM 
1. Overall Defensive Performance Results by Multi-Ship Formation 
Table 22 describes the simulation accomplishments for this portion of the study, 
specifically, an ASCM site firing on a modeled formation consisting of one AEGIS 
cruiser and two generically designed amphibious-class ships.  Three missile system 
combinations were modeled and tested, and in all cases a firing policy of SSL was 
applied.  This is due to the ASMD model limitation of one firing policy that can be 
utilized for all missile systems, as well as the superior performance of a SSL policy 
demonstrated in the single-ship portion of this study. 
Fifteen scenarios were run on the two amphibs alone to demonstrate their 
vulnerability when defending with RAM alone, the concept of which is illustrated in 
Figure 5.  For the three-ship composition, as depicted in Figure 6, three different defenses 
are applied.  For each defense measure, RAM is employed by the amphibs while the 
cruiser tests SM2ER, ESSM, and RAM.  The same forty-five scenarios are run for each 
formation defensive measure.  The model’s system limitations, as well as the time 
demands involved in running a three-ship simulation, made it necessary to limit each 







Defense Scenarios Trials/Scenario 
Total 
Trials 
2 Amphibs RAM 15 10 150
1 CG SM2ER 
2 Amphibs RAM 
45 5 225
1 CG ESSM 
2 Amphibs RAM 
45 5 225
1 CG RAM 
2 Amphibs RAM 
45 5 225
  150  825
Table 22. Simulation accomplishment for Multi-Ship Problem. 
 
Figure 5. An illustration of an ASCM attack on two amphibs in: a column, line of 
bearing (135R), and line abreast formations. 
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Figure 6. An illustration of the various dispositions employed by a multi-ship 
formation against each ASCM attack. 
Figure 7 offers a graph of the mean ASCM hits sustained by each amphib while 
operating without the support of a cruiser.  The sole defenses against an ASCM salvo of 
size 10 are RAM systems with a P(Hit) equivalent to 0.7, a softkill capability of 0.4, and 
the formation orientation.  Although a line of bearing formation appears to offer marginal 
improvement over the other two formations, each amphib can still expect an average of 
one hit for each missile exchange, or trial. 
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Mean ASCM Hits Against Two Amphibious Ships 
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Figure 7. Mean ASCM hits against different orientations of amphibious ship 
formations operating without a cruiser. 
Figure 8 offers an example of the improvements that a cruiser can provide to 
defense within the context of the ASMD model.  Selecting from the data in which the 
cruiser employs SM2ER and bears 270R and 2 nm from the Guide, both amphibs escape 
each missile exchange virtually unscathed. 
Within the context of the three-ship component of the study, a broad examination 
of the effects of formation orientation and cruiser bearing and range from the Guide 
demonstrates little impact is had. 
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CG: Bearing 270R, Range 2 nm
 
Figure 8. Mean ASCM hits against different orientations of multi-ship formation 
with cruiser bearing 270 Relative, range 2 nm, from the Guide. 
Figure 9 organizes the collection of data regarding the scenarios in which a 
cruiser and two amphibs are operating in mutual support.  Over the course of 675 trials, 
the total count of ASCM hits that are absorbed by the formation are organized by the type 
of formation employed and the defensive SAMs respectively employed by the cruiser and 
amphibs.  By inspection, there is no significant relationship between formation and the 
number of hits received by the ships.  The application of the Chi-Square test yields a 
similar result.  At a significance level of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 value for 4 df is 9.488.  
The calculated test statistic for this data is equal to 3.689 with a p-value of 0.450. 
A similar result is obtained when considering the effects of a cruiser’s bearing 
from the Guide on the total number of ASCM hits sustained.  Figure 10 illustrates this 
data, and an inspection of the graph yields the same conclusion as a Chi-Square test.  At a 
significance level of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 value for 8 df is 15.507.  The value of the 
calculated test statistic is 7.950 with a p-value of 0.438. 
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Total ASCM Hits vs Multi-Ship Formation Orientation 
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Figure 9. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and missile defense. 
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Figure 10. Total ASCM hits vs cruiser bearing from the Guide and missile defense. 
The third variable to be tested is the range of the cruiser from the Guide, and is 
illustrated in Figure 11.  The data representing the employment of SM2ER-RAM and 
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ESSM-RAM shows a consistent decrease in the number of hits incurred by the formation 
as the cruiser’s range decreases.  This result likely occurs due to the increased time and 
range over which to consummate engagements with SM2ER and ESSM, and is probably 
an ideal tactic to employ against a supersonic ASCM.  The closer the cruiser is to the 
amphibs, the better positioned it will be to intercept the threat.  The RAM-RAM data, 
representing employment of RAM by both the cruiser and amphibs, does not follow the 
same effect, most likely due to the limitations imposed by range and launch cycle time 
that were discussed in the single-ship portion of the study. 













































Figure 11. Total ASCM hits vs cruiser range from the Guide and missile defense. 
Application of a Chi-Square test to the question of cruiser range effects on 
sustained ASCM hits suggests the ships are collecting hits independent of the range of the 
cruiser from the Guide.  At a significance level of 0.05 the tabulated χ2 value for 4 df is 
9.488.  The calculated test statistic for this data is equal to 4.018 with a p-value of 0.404. 
2. An Examination of Smaller Subsets of Simulation Data 
a. Formation Orientation 
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Having looked at the data from a macro perspective in the previous 
section, it becomes appropriate to more narrowly approach the data collected from the 
multi-ship simulations.  Initially, an examination of the effects of formation orientation 
on ASCM hits within each one of three formational SAM employments, namely SM2ER-
RAM, ESSM-RAM, and RAM-RAM.  This data is represented in Figures 12, 13, and 14. 
Figure 12 displays the data for a multi-ship formation armed with 
SM2ER-RAM and testing the effectiveness of a column, line of bearing, and line abreast 
formations against the supersonic low-flyer.  However, a visual examination of the graph 
reveals that a formation defending with SM2ER-RAM can find no additional advantage 
in the orientation of the two amphibs. 



































































Figure 12. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and an SM2ER-RAM defense. 
Figure 13 exhibits the data for a multi-ship formation armed with ESSM-
RAM and likewise testing the effectiveness of a column, line of bearing, and line abreast 
formations against the threat ASCM.  A visual inspection of the graph shows formation 
orientation poses little advantage to the amphibs, but reveals marked improvements for 
the cruiser.  Placing the amphibs in a column formation when the cruiser shoots ESSM 
appears to minimize hits on the cruiser, while a line abreast is second best. 
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Figure 13. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and an ESSM-RAM defense. 
Far different observations are to be had according to the data displayed in 
Figure 14.  Clearly, while ESSM edges SM2ER as the most effective SAM to employ 
against a saturation attack, RAM is the worst performer.  Again, this is largely due to 
RAM’s inherent weaknesses as was previously discussed in the single-ship results.  No 







































































Figure 14. Total ASCM hits vs formation orientation and a RAM-RAM defense. 
b. Cruiser Bearing Relative to the Guide 
When the data is organized to check the effects of the cruiser’s bearing 
relative to the Guide, the graphs appear to offer some interesting results.  Figure 15 
displays the data for the set of scenarios in which the cruiser and amphibs are 
respectively armed with SM2ER and RAM. 
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As the dominant air warfare platform, the burden of defense truly falls on 
the cruiser to ensure the two high value units are safely escorted past the ASCM site.  
Figure 15 strongly suggests that the amphibs receive the greatest measure of protection 
when the cruiser’s relative bearing from the Guide is close to the threat axis of 270R.  Of 
the five relative bearings tested, 225R, 270R, and 315R all demonstrated that effective 
protection was being extended to the amphibs.  This is an excellent outcome to be 
generated by the ASMD model because it shows the model behaving in a manner 
consistent with real-world expectations.  These expectations include the consideration 
that a SAM shooter has greater engagement opportunities if he is firing downrange 
(threat missile coming directly at SAM shooter, features greater intercept ranges) rather 
than getting involved in crossrange (attempting to intercept threat missile at closest point 
of approach) or backrange  (SAM fired in situation where it must chase the threat missile) 
scenarios.  This result, however, comes at a high cost for the cruiser, having received 35, 
34, and 41 hits respectively over 225 simulation trials. 
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Figure 15. Total ASCM hits vs CG bearing relative to Guide and an SM2ER-RAM 
defense. 
Figure 15 further illustrates that when the cruiser is at a relative bearing 
furthest from the threat axis, the bulk of the ASCM hits is shifted to the amphibs.  This 
supports the reasonable expectation that when a missile is presented with three radar 
cross sections (RCS) in a column, it will choose at a larger frequency the target with the 
greatest RCS. 
Figures 16 and 17 are the graphical representations for the data collected 
from the remaining two sets of scenarios concerned with a cruiser’s relative bearing from 
the Guide.  Figure 16 covers the set of 45 scenarios during which the cruiser and amphibs 
are armed with ESSM and RAM respectively, and Figure 17 for the employment of RAM 
by all three ships against the threat.  Though the ASCM hit counts are different, the 
results faithfully follow the trends noted above in the case of SM2ER and RAM, and 
require no further discussion. 
43

















































































180 225 270 315 360









Figure 16. Total ASCM hits vs CG bearing relative to Guide and an ESSM-RAM 
defense. 
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c. Cruiser Range Relative to the Guide 
When the data is organized to check the effects of the cruiser’s range from 
the Guide, some consistency can be observed in the results.  Figure 18 displays the data 
for the set of scenarios in which the cruiser and amphibs are respectively armed with 
SM2ER and RAM.  Figure 19 describes the data for the formation’s employment of 
ESSM and RAM, and Figure 20 is employment of RAM by all units. 
Figures 18 and 19 suggest that when the cruiser’s range from the Guide 
decreases from 10 to 2 nautical miles, modest and consistent improvement is had for the 
self-defense of the cruiser.  This observation is not the case when the cruiser shoots 
RAM, as evidenced in Figure 20. 































































Figure 18. Total ASCM hits vs CG range from Guide and an SM2ER-RAM defense. 
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Figure 19. Total ASCM hits vs CG range from Guide and an ESSM-RAM defense. 

































































Figure 20. Total ASCM hits vs CG range from Guide and a RAM-RAM defense. 
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Despite the modest benefit had by the cruiser when stationed 2 nm away 
from the Guide, there is no significant evidence that mutual support is improved or exists 
at all, as was the case when the cruiser’s relative bearing from the Guide was discussed.  
In all three cases, the ASCM hits sustained by both amphibs are fairly unchanged from 
any range.  This is a poor result by the ASMD model, because the purpose of placing a 
SAM shooter in a shotgun position relative to one or more high value units is to 
significantly attrite the number of inbound threat missiles.  This has the added effect of 
reducing the number of hits on the protected unit or units, a crucial outcome that is not 
happening in the context of range from Guide. 
d. Specific Cases Where Successful Defense Can Be Noted 
A total of 225 scenarios were run in support of the three-ship defense 
concept, and for each scenario there are five trials.  Fifty-five of the scenarios resulted in 
zero hits on the high value units, or amphibs in this case.  In virtually all of these 55 
cases, the cruiser suffered at least one hit, and only once did the cruiser receive no hits 
across five trials.  Figure 21 is a graphical display of the number of ASCM hits absorbed 
by the cruiser across five trials for each of the 55 scenarios in which both amphibs 































Figure 21. Total ASCM hits on the cruiser in all scenarios in which both amphibs 
received no hits. 
Though the tactical commander is concerned mightily with the defense of 
the high value units, he obviously wants to mitigate ASCM hits on the SAM shooter.  In 
support of that goal, it is appropriate to focus on the left side of Figure 21. 
Table 23 captures the data that represents the fewest ASCM hits on the 
cruiser while the amphibs remain hitless.  Though none of the three amphibious 
formations shows up as a clear favorite, column and line abreast do appear to offer the 
most success for zero hits or a single hit.  In the case of the cruiser’s relative bearing from 
the Guide, one clearly cannot go wrong with positioning at 225R or 315R from the 
Guide, while 270R is not as strong, and 180R and 360R are ill-advised.  Cruiser range 
from the Guide works well at 2 or 5 nm, and employment of ESSM appears to offer the 






Formation CG Bearing CG Range CG SAM 
0 Hits Column 225R 5 ESSM 
Column 315R 2 SM2ER 
Column 225R 2 ESSM 
Line Abreast 315R 5 ESSM 1 Hit 
Line Abreast 315R 2 ESSM 
Line of Bearing 315R 5 SM2ER 
Line of Bearing 225R 5 ESSM 
Line of Bearing 225R 2 ESSM 
Line Abreast 270R 10 ESSM 
2 Hits 
Line Abreast 270R 2 ESSM 
Table 23. Summary of data representing the fewest ASCM hits on the cruiser. 
3. Pertinent Points Regarding Model Performance with Respect to the Multi-
Ship Problem 
It was Jim Townsend’s objective to find a new and effective method of modeling 
the targeting process in an anti-ship missile defense problem, and he has done so.  The 
important consideration of screen design, whether in defense of a High Value Unit or for 
the purposes of shared defense, is one that has not received much play in model design.  
Screen design is still practiced in the fleet today, and within this thesis has been shown to 
demonstrate effect. 
All of the points discussed in and at the conclusion of the Single Ship section of 
this chapter are also relevant here.  Therefore, with careful selection of values for the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to examine the utility of a recently 
developed but untested event-step model, the goal of which was to accurately model 
missile kinematics and the manner by which the missile chooses its target.  Anti-ship 
missile defense is a sizable and complex problem, and the U.S. Navy is always interested 
in discovering models that can help to meet the ASCM threat.  To assess the utility of this 
model, the author conducted an expansive set of simulations for the end purpose of 
understanding how the model behaves and what variables have the greatest or least 
impact on the modeled task force.  It was also deemed important to check some of those 
results against real-world expectations to determine the validity and consistency of the 
model.  These goals were accomplished in two ways, the first by running simulations 
involving a missile exchange with a single ship.  The second method was to run a series 
of simulations involving a multi-ship formation followed by application of the lessons 
learned from the single-ship study.  Any interesting insights divined from the generated 
data were commented on as well. 
A. COMMENTS REGARDING MODEL PERFORMANCE 
1. The Original Threat: Exocet 
The original threat ASCM to be applied to this study was based on the Exocet, a 
subsonic, low-flying missile that is found in many inventories around the world.  It was 
chosen by the author precisely because it has proliferated so widely and was a credible 
threat to U.S. Navy warships.  The initial set of simulations involved an Aegis cruiser 
armed with SM2ER defending against Exocet attacks.  Raid sizes were set at realistic 
values of two, four, and eight.  The results, however, were very disappointing.  An 
Exocet scored a hit against the cruiser only once every 75 trials, and only in cases where 
the raid size was greater than four ASCMs. 
Townsend conducted limited simulations with the ASMD model, namely a four-
ship screen design of which one of the ships was a CVN occupying the center of the 
screen.  A cruiser was positioned directly ahead of the CVN, while two DD 963s were 
stationed abaft of the carrier.  Applying a subsonic threat based on the Silkworm missile, 
Townsend found penetration of the screen for the purpose of achieving a hit against the 
CVN to be virtually impossible, contending the cruiser fired too fast for a Silkworm to 
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get by.  The only way a hit on the carrier could occur was by firing off-axis, or to 
overwhelm the defense with salvo sizes equal to 100.  Even then, hits occurred only when 
firing at the DD 963s. (Townsend email of October 4, 2000) 
The superb performance of the defensive missile systems as demonstrated by the 
Exocet results and the Townsend simulations (particularly the use of 100 missile salvos) 
did not bode well for future applications of the ASMD model.  Real-world systems 
simply are not that effective.  However, the vigorous exercise of the model, as done in 
this study with the single-ship problem, has demonstrated that methods can be employed 
to mitigate the ASMD model’s weaknesses.  The primary determinant of a threat 
ASCM’s success is its speed, and in this case, employing a Mach 2.5 missile yielded 30 
hits for every 75 trials.  In addition, altering the performance of sensors to provide a less 
than perfect detection capability is bound to balance the results of the missile exchange. 
2. ASCM Attrition by Fuel 
ASCM attrition by fuel depletion is included in the data collection process, and 
when running the Exocet scenarios, this data appeared entirely reasonable because of the 
infrequency of attrition by fuel.  Townsend also reported that he had not experienced any 
problems with this aspect of the model while running his scenarios (Townsend email of 
October 16, 2000).  Within the model, each instance that the missile checks its position, it 
calculates the distance traveled up to that point. 
When the transition in this study was made to the more survivable supersonic 
ASCM, the fuel attrition reports yielded an unusual result.  Specifically, in each trial 
conducted, 40 – 60 percent of the ASCM raid consistently attrited due to fuel.  The range 
of the ASCM launcher played no effect in this result.  A threat missile with a 50 nm 
range would consistently attrite from fuel in the above percentages irrespective of the 
range to the target (15, 25, or 35).  The source of the flaw within the model’s code has not 
yet been identified, but it is likely that the problem went unnoticed in the Exocet portion 
of this study because the cruiser intercepted almost every ASCM fired.  Fuel attrition is a 
nice characteristic to have in a model, and one that has not received much attention by 
other models but was successfully incorporated by Townsend.  Since fuel attrition wasn’t 
much relevant to the objectives of this thesis, a temporary solution was achieved for this 
study that involved disabling that feature of the ASMD model. 
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3. Data Collection Restrictions on a Modeled Ship with Multiple SAMs 
Though it is possible to place more than one missile launcher on a ship, the model 
is not yet ready to collect data results for each specific missile system.  Instead, the data 
collected on ASCMs killed would aggregate the results from the different SAMs used 
within a single trial.  However, it is a feature that Townsend is working to incorporate in 
a future version of the ASMD model that will offer some great opportunities to do missile 
performance comparisons. 
4. Simulation Run Time 
Each time a scenario was run with a maximum of five trials, the simulation would 
last between five and ten minutes.  Two constraints limited the number of trials that could 
be run.  The first was that the volume of scenarios to be simulated was quite large, so 
trials had to be kept at a minimum.  These time requirements exerted great drag on the 
process of running simulations, particularly if an error was found after the fact or 
fundamental changes to the scenario had to be made. 
The second problem that surfaced and insisted on a five-trial minimum for each 
scenario run was due to a consistent tendency for the ASMD model to freeze up in mid-
simulation.  This effect resulted if the number of trials scheduled by the user within the 
executable portion of the model exceeded five.  The root cause of this problem was never 
resolved, though there are suggestions that it relates to model design.  It may be that the 
level of mathematical calculations involved in modeling missile flight are so great that 
the program grinds slowly to a halt, or the problem may relate to model design.  It may be 
that the creation and destruction of java objects are not managed efficiently enough, and a 
different methodology might be necessary that would apply a recycling principle and/or 
reduce memory requirements. 
5. ASMD Documentation 
The ASMD model is very ambitious in its design, and could benefit from 
additional documentation within the java code so that the programmer’s intentions can be 
fully understood.  This issue was mitigated by regular communication with Jim 
Townsend.  Were this not the case, it would have been extremely difficult for any person 
lacking significant java and simulation experience to successfully navigate the code. 
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B. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions regarding the ASMD model are the following: 
1. The ASMD model is not yet a user-friendly tool.  The code is not easy to 
follow or understand, and frequent communication and collaboration with Jim Townsend 
was a necessity.  Not having a graphical user interface (GUI), in most cases a luxury, 
compels the user to delve deeply into the code to manipulate the necessary variables or 
augment the program in order to achieve the desired result. 
2. Analysis of future missile systems can be undertaken, as was the case for 
ESSM and RAM in this study.  It is entirely possible to begin with a set of details and 
expectations about a specific system, and then model the system so that the performance 
within the context of the simulation will be reasonable. 
3. Defensive missile systems have too great an advantage over threat ASCMs 
in the current incarnation of the ASMD model.  The success rate for the modeled 
SM2ER, ESSM, and RAM systems was simply too high.  The primary cause for the high 
effectiveness of these systems is the perfect detection and tracking capability modeled for 
the sensors. 
4. Simulation of the multi-ship formation produced results that appear to be 
consistent with real-world tactics.  Specifically, stationing a SAM shooter near the threat 
axis has a positive effect on defense.  Some agreement could also be found regarding the 
range of the SAM shooter to the high value units, in that a shorter range yielded positive 
results. 
5. Once the model is understood, it can quickly and easily be applied to 
address the concerns of the tactical commander.  Oftentimes, overnight analysis is 
required when contingencies arise unexpectedly, and the ASMD model demonstrates the 
potential not yet fulfilled for application as a tactical decision aid. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following list of recommendations is not exhaustive, but does offer some key 
suggestions for improving the ASMD model: 
• Develop a GUI to increase the user friendliness of the model. 
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• Find the cause and eliminate the tendency of the model to freeze in mid-
simulation.  This may be a result of computational drag, or the non-optimal 
management of mover objects within the model. 
 
• Level the playing field that exists between the defensive missile systems and the 
threat ASCMs.  This can probably be accomplished by some combination of the 
following changes: (1) establishing a range-based Probability of Hit, (2) 
association of a stealth factor or characteristic to the ASCM that the model can 
respond to by inhibiting detection or tracking, or (3) modification of the current 
sensor properties to allow for stressors that complicate the detect-to-engage 
process. 
 
• Associate an animation feature to the model, so that the objects (missiles and 
ships) can visually be observed on a display.  This would permit another level of 
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